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Abstract 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis that self development plays a role in the offset of 
childhood amnesia; assessing the importance of both the capacity to anchor a memory to 
the self-concept, and the strength of the self-concept as an anchor. We demonstrate for the 
first time that the volume of 3- to 6-year-old’s specific autobiographical memories is 
predicted by both the volume of their self-knowledge, and their capacity for self-source 
monitoring within self-referencing paradigms (N =186). Moreover, there is a bidirectional 
relationship between self and memory, such that autobiographical memory mediates the 
link between self-source monitoring and self-knowledge. These predictive relationships 
suggests that the self memory system is active in early childhood.  
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 “Episodic memory differs from other forms of memory in that its operations require 
a self. It is the self that engages in the mental activity that is referred to as mental time travel: 
there can be no travel without a traveler” 
Tulving, 2005, pp.14-15 
The above quotation makes clear that there is a close connection between self and 
memory; without the meta-representative self, we have no sense of connection to the past or 
future, no access to our own autobiography. The ‘me’ inherent in memory was recognized 
early (Hulme, 1739/2003; James, 1890; Locke, 1690/1995), and the relationship between self 
and memory continues to guide modern theories of autobiographical processing. For 
example, Conway’s influential self-memory system (SMS) describes how the information 
that we encode and retrieve is dynamically driven by the goals of the ‘working self’ 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Drawing from an existing knowledge 
base containing both episodic and semantic self-knowledge, the working self aims to 
maintain a coherent sense of identity, and to ensure that short term self-relevant goals (e.g. to 
pay a bill) are met. In this model, the self-concept therefore both drives the capture of, and is 
maintained by, incoming episodic information (see Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2008). It 
follows from this bidirectional relationship that the developmental onset and growth of 
autobiographical memory and the conceptual self will be closely linked. However, very little 
empirical work has explored the relationship between these systems across childhood. The 
current research addresses this gap in our understanding, examining the association between 
3 to 6-year-old children’s self-source monitoring, self-knowledge and autobiographical 
memories, in an effort to elucidate the offset of childhood amnesia. 
Early autobiographical memory  
It has been established for more than a century that autobiographical memory 
development is associated with a period of amnesia; we remember no personal events 
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preceding our 2nd or 3rd birthday, and relatively few from early childhood (Henri & Henri, 
1898; Pillemer & White, 1989; Tustin & Hayne, 2010). Although the cause of infant and 
childhood amnesia is yet to be established (Bauer, 2015), prevailing theories focus on the 
idea that early amnesia may be offset by developments in social, cognitive and linguistic 
domains which qualitatively change the manner in which episodic memories are encoded and 
retrieved, and open the possibility of autobiographical retention (e.g. Bauer, 2015; Fivush, 
2011; Hayne, 2004; Howe & Courage, 1993, 1997, 2004; Howe, Courage & Edison, 2003; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; 
Welch-Ross, 1995a). Of current relevance, Howe and Courage (1993, 1997, 2004; Howe et 
al., 2003) take the logical standpoint that the development of an objective concept of self is a 
minimal requirement for the encoding and retrieval of an event which one remembers 
experiencing.  
The mirror mark test of self-recognition provides the first evidence of an idea of ‘me’. 
In the mark test, children are surreptitiously marked in a visually inaccessible area of the face 
before being shown their reflection in a mirror. By the age of two years, children typically 
connect the mirror self-representation with their body in the real world, as demonstrated by 
their reaching to their face to explore the unexpected mark (Courage, Edison, & Howe, 
2004). Drawing attention to the parallel emergence of mirror self-recognition and the earliest 
autobiographical memories, Howe and Courage (1993, 1997, 2004; Howe, Courage & 
Edison, 2003) suggest that until self-representation is present, children cannot explicitly 
reflect on experiences as belonging to the self.  As a result, they cannot store self-referent 
memories of early life events. The idea that the salience of self may influence the strength of 
a memory can also be found in literature describing the ‘reminiscence bump’ in 
adolescence/early adulthood, thought to be tied to the defining role of this period in 
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constructing personal identity (Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque, 2005; Rathbone et al., 
2008; Rubin, Weltzler & Nebes, 1986).  
There is some direct evidence to support a relationship between the emergence of self 
and autobiographical memory. Howe et al. (2003) tested a cohort of 15- to 23-month-old 
children on the mirror mark test, and involved them in hiding a toy. Up to 12 months later, 
those who were self-recognizers at the time of the hiding event were more likely to remember 
the location of the hidden toy. Likewise, Harley and Reese (1999) report a positive 
association between 19-month-olds’ self-recognition and their ability to sequence actions in a 
deferred imitation task spanning one week. They also found that both mirror self-recognition 
and maternal reminiscing style predicted children’s ability to provide specific details of past 
life events.  
These studies support Howe’s contention that the offset of infantile amnesia may be 
connected to the development of the self-concept. However, they do not directly assess 
children’s ability to ‘tag’ memories as their own. The development of self-source monitoring 
offers a potentially valuable source of evidence here. Traditionally, measuring this ability 
requires children to specify the source of their action memories as imagined, witnessed or 
performed (Foley & Johnson, 1985; Welch-Ross, 1995b), or to identify the source of 
semantic knowledge (e.g. how did you find out X?) (Drumney & Newcombe, 2002; Perner & 
Ruffman, 1995). Although self-actions are implicated in such paradigms, the role of the self 
is typically not considered. A notable exception comes from the overlapping developmental 
literature on the subject-performed task (SPT) effect (see for example, Ross, Anderson & 
Campbell, 2011a Study 1). Typically-developing children as young as three years show better 
memory for action phrases which they have enacted, relative to action phrases they have 
encoded passively. This research implies that personally experiencing an event makes it more 
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memorable for children, and is keeping with Howe and colleagues’ idea that autonoetic 
experiences lead to stronger or distinct memory traces.  
Indeed, a number of theorists have highlighted the importance of binding a memory to 
source information in order for it to be re-experienced in an autonoetic manner (Bauer, 2015; 
Hayne, 2004; Johnson et al., 1993; Newcombe, Drummey, Fox, Lie, & Ottinger-Alberts, 
2000; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Raj & Bell, 2010). According to these accounts, memories 
encoded with contextual information pertaining to the subjective experience of the event 
(emotions, smells, sounds) are qualitatively richer than memories encoded without this 
information, which might be considered semantic. In this model, encoding agentive 
experience is viewed as necessary to enrich the memory trace, creating a memory that is 
resistant to forgetting (Bauer, 2015; Hayne, 2004; see also Prudhomme (2005) for evidence 
linking this to mirror self-recognition). Meta-cognitively reflecting on this information to 
identify the source of the memory as being experienced by ‘me’ is also viewed as important 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Newcombe et al., 2000; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Raj & Bell, 2010; 
Welch-Ross, 1995a). Meta-cognitive reflection distinguishes the state of ‘remembering’ as 
distinct from the subjective state of ‘knowing’ (Tulving, 2005), and is by definition necessary 
for autobiographical recall. First emerging between the ages of 3 and 4 years (Pillow, 1989) 
and increasing across childhood (Piolino, Hisland, Ruffeveille, Matuszewski, Jambaqué, & 
Eustache, 2007); Welch-Ross (1995a) argues that it is the remember-know distinction that 
allows children to enter into dialogues with others about personally experienced events 
(rehearsing and elaborating the memory), and allows remembered events to be stored as 
belonging to the self. The available evidence suggests that both autonoetic source monitoring 
capacity and binding of specific details within an event develop gradually across early 
childhood (see Raj & Bell, 2010 for review). However, developments in self-specific source 
monitoring in childhood have not been empirically related to developments in 
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autobiographical memory. This evidence is necessary to support Howe and Courage’s (1993, 
1997, 2004; Howe et al., 2003) theory that tagging an event as self-referent is key to the 
offset of childhood amnesia. Accordingly, linking the development of self-specific source 
monitoring to autobiographical memory is a key aim of the current paper. Our second key 
aim is to link age-related change in the self-concept to age-related change in autobiographical 
memoryin early childhood. Using mirror self-recognition to test Howe and colleagues’ theory 
limits the period of qualitative change to the period of 18 to 24 months. However, amnesia 
persists beyond infancy, as reflected in the slow growth of memories for events in early 
childhood (Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, Tustin, 2011; Nuttall, Valentino, Comas, 
McNeill, & Stey, 2014; Tustin & Hayne, 2010). Howe and colleagues argue that the gradual 
offset of childhood amnesia is related to gradual development in the self-concept, 
strengthening the anchor to which memories are attached. However, this critical aspect of 
their theory remains untested.  
Early self-reference effects 
The self-concept may act as an effective anchor for memories by offering a 
psychologically rich network of knowledge in which to embed incoming information. This 
supportive role of the self in memory is exemplified by the ‘self-reference effect’ (SRE). This 
describes a mnemonic advantage for information encoded with reference to self (Rogers, 
Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Well-established in adults (see Symons & Johnson, 1997 for meta-
analysis), the SRE is typically measured by asking participants to process whether 
psychological trait words (friendly, clever, honest) are self-descriptive. When compared to 
trait words processed in reference to another person (“Is Trump clever?”), or non-socially 
(“Is this word in upper or lower case?”), memory for self-processed trait words is superior. 
The SRE is thought to arise from organization and elaboration of the trait word within a rich 
body of existing semantic and autobiographical self-knowledge (Klein, 2012; Symons & 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            8 
 
 
Johnson, 1997). The SRE may also arise from preferential encoding (Cunningham & Turk, 
2017; Turk, Cunningham & Macrae, 2008), since self-relevant cues in the environment are 
likely to capture attention (Bargh, 1982; Brédart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006). These 
attentional, elaborative and organisational explanations of the SRE are entirely consistent 
with the multi-faceted role of self described in Conway’s SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
Although children can show an SRE on the traditional trait paradigm, reported 
developmental patterns are mixed (Bennett & Sani, 2008; Halpin, Puff, Mason & Marston, 
1984; Pullyblank, Bisanz, Scott, & Champion, 1985), perhaps because the trait task is 
developmentally challenging (Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn & Turk, 2014). Using more age-
appropriate measures of self-referencing, children as young as three years have been found to 
show a memory advantage for stimuli linked with the self (Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae & 
Turk 2013; Cunningham, et al., 2014; Ross et al., 2011a; Sui & Zhu, 2005). Although the 
SRE has rarely been related to the childhood amnesia debate (see Ross et al., 2011a), the 
finding that young children can benefit from the SRE provides indirect support for Howe and 
Courage’s (1993, 1997, 2004; Howe et al., 2003) theory that the self is active in 
strengthening event memories in early childhood.   
Exploring the emerging SRE in more depth, Cunningham et al. (2014, Exp’s 1 and 2) 
adapted the traditional paradigm for use with children by substituting the trait adjective for a 
picture of a toy or household object, which the child was asked to assess for desirability to 
themselves (when pictured with own face) or another child (when pictured with another face). 
Cunningham et al. found that 4- to 6-year-olds had a robust SRE, remembering more of the 
items shown with their own face than those presented with the other child. Interestingly, this 
effect emerged regardless of whether conscious evaluation was required during encoding; 
when the task was modified such that the identity of the face was incidental to the task (by 
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asking the child to report the locus of the object rather than its desirability), Cunningham et 
al. (Exp. 3) found that images presented with the self were still better remembered. This 
‘incidental’ SRE (see Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008) was similar in magnitude to the 
‘evaluative’ SRE, and was age-invariant. Critical to autobiographical processing, 4- to 6-
year-old children in Cunningham et al.’s (2014) study also showed a self-bias in source 
memory for incidentally and evaluatively self-relevant items. This is important because a) 
source memory elevates recognition scores to fulfill the criteria for episodic recall, 
demonstrating conscious self-processing, and b) the children’s source-bias implies that they 
have entered the SMS system, in which self-relevant events have mnemonic priority.  
Source-monitoring within the SRE paradigm therefore allows one to determine if an 
episodic memory has been tagged as self-referent, and if this tagging has any mnemonic 
benefit. Moreover, unlike the mirror mark test of self-recognition, the SRE paradigm is not 
limited to a binary perspective on the quality of memories before and after the onset of mirror 
self-recognition at two years. Rather, the capacity for binding an event to self across various 
levels of self-processing (for example, incidental, evaluative) can be employed to probe the 
potentially complex role of self-development in the critical period of amnesia recession. This 
allows elucidation of Howe and Courage (1993, 1997, 2004; Howe et al., 2003) and Welch-
Ross’s (1995a) suggestions that the offset of infantile amnesia is not sudden, but recedes 
gradually across childhood as the self-concept grows in size and complexity (Eder, 1989, 
1990; Harter, 1999; Montmayer & Eisen, 1977; Wang, 2004).  
The current inquiry 
We aim to examine, for the first time, the relationship between the autobiographical 
memory system and theself-conceptin early childhood (three to six- years). We assess the 
quantity of detail provided in children’s autobiographical event memories, and relate this to 
source memory for self- and other-referenced stimuli in the SRE paradigm, and for self- and 
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other-performed actions in the SPT. Source monitoring in incidental, evaluative and physical 
self-reference paradigms is included since each aspect of these memories is necessary to form 
mature autobiographical memory; one must autonoetically remember experiencing the event 
(SPT task), attend to the role of self (incidental SRE) and integrate the event with extant self-
knowledge (evaluative SRE). Alongside these memory measures, we assess self-knowledge 
by asking children to respond to the standard “Who am I?” test (Montmayer & Eisen, 1977; 
Wang, 2004). Using this methodology, the current paper provides the first comprehensive test 
of the relationship between the self and memory described by Howe and Courage (1993, 
1997, 2004; Howe et al., 2003); assessing the importance of both the capacity to anchor a 
memory to the self-concept (as measured by source-monitoring), and the strength of the self-
concept as an anchor (as measured by self-description).   
Following extant research, we expect to replicate the finding that self-performed 
actions and self-referenced stimuli are better remembered by young children than stimuli 
linked with others (Cunningham et al., 2014; Ross et al., 2011a). We also expect source-
monitoring capacity (Drumney & Newcombe, 2002; Foley & Johnson, 1985; Welch-Ross, 
1995b), the quantity of specific autobiographical details of past events  (Hayne et al., 2011; 
Nuttall et al., 2014; Tustin & Hayne, 2010) and the quantity of self-descriptive detail to 
increase with age (Eder, 1989, 1990; Harter, 1999; Montmayer & Eisen, 1977; Wang, 2004). 
Crucially, we assess for the first time [to our knowledge] whether these age-related changes 
are predictive of one another, even when controlling for vocabulary and memory capacity. It 
is important to control for vocabulary given that the amount of detail provided in children’s 
self-descriptions and autobiographical reports may vary with linguistic capacity. Controlling 
for general memory capacity is important to support Howe and Courage’s (1993, 1997, 2004; 
Howe et al., 2003) claim that the offset of childhood amnesia is self-specific.  
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Specifically, we hypothesize that source monitoring in SPT and SRE tasks, alongside 
the volume of children’s self-descriptions, will be predictive of the volume of 
autobiographical event details If the former relationship is self-specific, and not a 
consequence of general memory processes, then self-source monitoring within the SPT and 
SRE paradigms should be a better predictor of autobiographical memory than other-source 
monitoring (where the child identifies another person as the source of their knowledge). This 
predictive model would provide clear evidence for the idea that tagging a memory as one’s 
own improves its memorability, due to the supportive nature of the self-concept in motivating 
the capture of and organizing the storage of self-referent information. Moreover, recognizing 
the bidirectional nature of self and memory, we hypothesize that children’s self-knowledge 
will be predicted by the volume of their autobiographical event narratives. This predictive 
relationship would provide evidence for the idea that the autobiographical memory base 
(described by Conway’s SMS) is responsible for maintaining and growing an idea of ‘me’. 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 186 three to six year old children were recruited (M = 56.99 months, range 
= 36 - 85 months; 54% female). All children had English as a first language, and were pupils 
at local nurseries or schools of medium to low socio-economic status. The children were 
tested with the written consent of a parent or guardian, and their own assent, and the research 
was approved by Abertay and Dundee University’s Psychology Ethics Committees. 
Procedure and materials 
The children were tested individually over three sessions on five tasks measuring: 
autobiographical memory, self-description, memory for self-performed action, self-relevant 
action, and receptive vocabulary. Testing was carried out in the child’s place of education, 
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with each child completing one session per week for three consecutive weeks. At the end of 
each session, the child was thanked, given a sticker and taken back to class. 
Session 1 
SPT. During the first session, the children completed a subject-performed action task 
(the SPT) adapted from Ross et al. (2011a). Participants were introduced to a fictional 
character called a “wug”. Across a series of 24 picture cards revealed in turn, the Wug was 
depicted performing everyday actions. The experimenter and participant acted out alternate 
actions modeled by the wug, with the order of the actions counterbalanced across 
experimenter and participant. After a delay in which participants completed the NIH Toolbox 
vocabulary Task (see below), they were then asked to free recall the actions, and identify the 
source of each (i.e., indicate whether they were performed by self or the experimenter). To 
provide a self-source score, the proportion of hits for self actions was calculated (i.e., number 
of self items correctly attributed to being conducted by self/12 = total number of self actions). 
The equivalent score was calculated for other-source. To correct for guessing, the proportion 
of false alarms was calculated for self and other actions (number of other actions incorrectly 
identified as self or other/12) and subtracted from raw scores to give a final, corrected score 
for self-source (proportion self hits – proportion self false alarms) and other-source 
(proportion other hits – proportion other false alarms).  
NIH Toolbox Vocabulary Task (see Akshoomoff et al, 2014). This task was performed 
on a touchscreen laptop provided by the experimenter. Within each trial a set of four pictures 
was presented onscreen simultaneously with a spoken word that described one of the pictures. 
Participants were then asked to select the picture that best matched the spoken word by 
touching the appropriate picture on the laptop screen.  Participants were given as much time 
as required to complete each trial. Due to the lack of reading or literacy requirement this task 
was deemed suitable for children of all ages and abilities. This is a computer adapted task 
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whereby the difficulty of each successive item presented is based on the current estimate of 
the participant’s ability level, as estimated by their responses to the previously administered 
items on the test. Items were administered to match each participant’s ability with item 
difficulty. Each participant was exposed to 25 trials and the task lasted on average 
approximately 5 minutes. The children received an age corrected score with a normative 
mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15.  
At the end of Session 1 each participant’s photograph was taken for use in the 
subsequent testing session. This picture was used to cue self-reference in the SRE task, which 
replicated the methods of Cunningham et al. (2014). 
Session 2 
SRE task. Before seeing the child for a second time, the experimenter cropped the 
photograph taken in Session 1 using picture editing software, creating a 250 x 250 pixel (72 
dpi) image of the child’s face on a transparent background. This picture was used to cue self-
referencing. Facial photographs of age-matched controls who were unknown to the 
participants, were modified in the same way to create gender and age-matched other-referent 
cues named “Sam” as a unisex name. On arrival, the child sat at a table facing a 15” laptop 
with a touchscreen. The experimenter sat beside the child, in front of the laptop. The 
experiment was run using EPrime experimental software, and consisted of an encoding task 
followed by an unexpected recognition memory test.  
In the encoding phase a face was presented on a white background in the centre of the 
touch-screen monitor for 2,000 ms. In half of the trials, this was the child’s own face (“self-
referent” trials). The other half comprised “other-referent” trials, in which the face of the 
unknown, same-sex child was presented. Self-referent and other-referent trials were presented 
in an order randomized by the software. During the trial, 500 ms after the onset of the face, 
an object was shown in a box to the left or right of the face. Objects (e.g., toothbrush, 
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broccoli), and were presented as 250 X 250 pixel (72 dpi) color photographic images on a 
white background. The presented objects were taken from a total of 72 for the 3-4 year old 
children, and 108 for the 5-6 year old children (with age-appropriate stimuli set lengths 
determined by pilot testing). The objects were split into three equal lists. For each child, one 
of the three lists was presented in self-referent trials, one was presented in other-referent 
trials, and the third was reserved to be used as foils in the subsequent recognition memory 
test. The use of these lists was counterbalanced across participants.  
Two versions of this task were used: ‘evaluative’ and ‘incidental’ versions, following 
Cunningham et al. (2014). In the evaluative version of the SRE task, the children’s task was 
to evaluate the object with reference to the faces. Specifically, they were asked, “Would you 
[Sam] really, like this object, or would you [Sam] not like it?” The two images (i.e., face and 
object) remained onscreen together for 1,500 ms, then a 100-ms blank interstimulus interval 
preceded presentation of two yellow circle “buttons” depicting a smiley and neutral face, 
respectively. The children were asked to touch either the smiley face or neutral face button to 
indicate the outcome of their evaluation. Following the child’s response, the faces 
disappeared and a blank 1,000 ms interval preceded presentation of the next trial. Before 
beginning the experimental trials, each child was given three practice trials (two self-referent 
and one other-referent trial) to ensure that they recognized their own face, understood the task 
instructions, and were able to evaluate their own and the other-referent’s likely feelings 
toward the objects. All the children recognized themselves and were able to follow the task 
instructions. After the practice trials, the children were encouraged to keep attending to the 
items onscreen to avoid missing any objects, and were asked not to talk during the task. After 
completing the experimental trials, the children were praised for their concentration before 
being introduced to the memory task.  
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The stimuli and procedure for the incidental version of the cognitive SRE task exactly 
followed that of the evaluative version, with the exception that instead of being asked to 
evaluate each object with reference to self or the other-referent, the children were asked 
simply to report on which side of the screen the object had been presented. This involved 
presenting two yellow circles as response buttons, with no neutral or smiley faces. The size, 
color, brightness, and position of these “left” and “right” buttons were exactly matched with 
the face response buttons presented in the evaluative version.  All the children recognized 
themselves and were able to follow the task instructions. Since piloting indicated that the 
evaluative and incidental SRE tasks interfered with one another if given on a within subjects 
basis, children completed EITHER the evaluative or incidental version (random assignment). 
In the memory phase, children completed a one-step source memory test, with 
participants being asked to respond to each picture with one of the following answers: “New 
picture”, “Shown with me” or “Shown with Sam”. The children were told they could guess if 
they were not sure of their answer. The child responded by pressing the appropriate key on 
the keyboard. Keys were annotated with “New” “Me” “Sam” Once the child had made their 
response the object disappeared and a 1,000ms inter-trial interval preceded presentation of 
the next object. Following Cunningham et al (2014), the self-source score was calculated by 
subtracting the proportion of “self” false alarm rate (New items incorrectly identified as 
“Shown with me”/total number of new items) from the proportion of self-referent items 
correctly identified as “Shown with me”. Likewise, the other-referent source score was 
scored by subtracting “other” false alarm rate (New items incorrectly identified as shown 
with Sam/ total number of new items) from items correctly identified as shown with the 
other-referent. This correction method ensures that the data analyzed focuses on accurate 
source plus recognition data i.e. data which fulfils the criteria for episodic recall. This data is 
corrected for guessing by subtracting data from foils, for which there is no accurate memory. 
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Children also make source confusions i.e. identifying old items with the wrong source. These 
may represent familiarity rather than recall and are not included in the calculations here.  
Session 3 
During the final testing session participants were interviewed about their early 
memories and self-knowledge following a procedure used by Wang (2004), and their 
responses recorded on a Dictaphone and subsequently transcribed. The experimenter told the 
child that they had some questions to ask and would record their responses. The child was 
assured there was no right or wrong answer and just to respond with whatever they could 
think of.  
Autobiographical memory. To elicit autobiographical event narratives, the 
experimenter asked the children “What can you remember about your first day of 
school/nursery?”, and “What can you remember about your last birthday?”. These events 
were chosen because they objectively happened to all of the children in the past and are 
culturally considered memorable. Following each response the experimenter used standard 
prompts such as “What else can you remember?” and “Is there anything else?” until the child 
indicated by speech or gesture they had finished.  
Propositions, as described by Fivush, Haden, and Adam (1995; see also Wang, 2004) 
as subject-verb propositions, were used as the coding unit with each new proposition 
counting as a new unit (e.g., “I dance” was one unit; “I dance and swim” was two units). The 
propositions that made up children’s memory reports were coded as either specific if they 
referred to a memory that occurred at a particular point in time (e.g., I had a Spiderman 
birthday cake) or general for memories that referred to events that took place on multiple 
occasions or happened regularly (e.g., I had a birthday cake; Wang, 2004). Following Wang 
(2004) specific memories were given a score of 1, and general memories a score of 0, to 
preserve a focus on autobiographical rather than semantic information. The total number of 
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specific memory propositions provided were summed across memory reports to create an 
overall score. This coding method is designed to provide a meaningful measure of both 
volume and specificity of autobiographical reports. 
Self-description. Next the experimenter used an open-ended question to elicit the 
child’s self-description. The experimenter told the child “I wonder if you can tell me some 
things all about you, some things that would describe {child’s name] to me?” The 
experimenter prompted the child after each response with “What else could I write about 
you?” until the child indicated by speech or gesture that they had finished. Interviews were 
transcribed verbatim onto paper at a later date (Wang, 2004). Responses referring to qualities, 
opinions or traits were coded as abstract (e.g., “I love to cycle”); responses referring to 
physical traits or facts (e.g., “I have glasses”; “I live on a farm”) were coded as concrete self-
descriptions (Wang, 2004). Since the volume of abstract responses was relatively low, 
analyses were based on total self-description scores, created by summing the number of 
abstract and concrete details provided. 
The autobiographical memory and self-description tasks were completed in this fixed 
order to replicate Wang (2004), and since piloting indicated that the autobiographical 
memory task was a more effective conversation opener than the free self-description task. 
Inter-rater reliability for coding within the autobiographical memory task (specific versus 
general) and self-description task (abstract versus concrete) was established by having the 
data coded by two independent raters (authors 1 and 3), and yielded a robust Cohen’s kappa 
score (k = .971 overall, k = .929 specific versus general, k = .993, concrete versus abstract). 
Raters were blind to any details of the child’s age or performance when coding 
autobiographical reports and self-descriptions. 
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Results 
The first section below (a) describes checks that our data yielded predicted patterns 
regarding self v. other-referent encoding, and age. Thus the sample was split by median age 
to create two equal age groups (N = 93 each) for comparison in between subjects analyses 
(Younger age group 36 – 55 months; older age group 56 – 85 months). The two age groups 
were combined for the main results section (b), in which age by months was included as a co-
variate for detailed analysis regarding our key theoretical predictions. 
(a) Referent and age patterns 
Effects of Self v. Other-referent encoding 
Table 1 shows performance in the SRE and SPT tasks. Recall accuracy was highest 
on the SRE tasks, which were supported by forced choice picture prompts, and particularly 
high when encoding required evaluation of the to-be remembered item (as would expected 
from this deeper processing). There was a bias for accurate self-source memory across all 
tasks, which was similar for younger and older children. 
Table 1: SPT and SRE performance, overall and split by median age 
Task Proportion of accurate responses 
 Overall  
Corrected M 
(Raw M), SE 
Younger 
Corrected M (Raw 
M), SE 
Older 
Corrected M  
(Raw M), SE 
SPT self-source .090 (.114), .008 .046 (.076), .011 .134 (.15), .011 
SPT other-source .064 (.077), .007 .020 (.038), .010 .109(.118), .010 
Incidental SRE self-source .226 (.417), .028 .136 (.475), .038 .316 (.453), .040 
Incidental SRE other-source .150 (.289), .024 .096 (.286), .033 .205 (.291), .035 
Evaluative SRE self-source .375(.60), .027 .164 (.537), .039 .589 (.671), .039 
Evaluative SRE other-source .271 (.417), .024 .083 (.305), .033 .458 (.528), .034 
 
The SPT scores were analyzed using a 2 (Referent: self, other) x 2 (Age Group: 
younger, older) mixed ANOVA. Both main effects were found to be significant with source 
memory increasing with age F(1, 182) = 56.10, p < .001, partial Ƞ² = .24; and more self-
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actions attributed to the correct source relative to other-actions, F(1, 177) = 8.55, p = .004, 
partial Ƞ² = .05. There was no interaction between Referent and Age Group [F(1, 182) = .01, 
p = .94, partial Ƞ² = .00.  
The two SRE scores were submitted to a combined analysis, using a 2 (Referent: self, 
other) X 2 (SRE Task: evaluative, incidental) x 2 (Age group: younger, older) mixed 
ANOVA. All three main effects were found to be significant, with source memory being 
better in the evaluative SRE task (M = .32, SE= .02) relative to the incidental SRE task (M = 
.19, SE = .02), F(1, 176) = .18.02, p < .001,  partial Ƞ² = .09;  increasing with age F(1, 176) = 
74.02, p < .001,  partial Ƞ² = .30 (M = .12, SE = .02 and M = .39, SE = .02 respectively); and 
being better for self-referent items (M = .30, SE = .02) relative to other-referent items (M = 
.21, SE = .02), F(1, 176) = 25.59, p < .001, partial Ƞ² = .13. There was no evidence of any 
interactions: Referent x SRE Task interaction F(1, 176) = .64, p = .42,  partial Ƞ² = .00; 
Referent x Age Group interaction F(1, 176) = 3.07, p = .08, partial Ƞ² = .02; Referent x SRE 
Task x Age Group interaction F(1, 176) = .70, p = .79,  partial Ƞ² = .00.  
Self-knowledge and autobiographical memory in younger and older children 
The quantity of information about autobiographical events was highly variable across 
both age groups, but on average older children provided a higher volume of specific details 
than younger children (see Table 2). Likewise for self-descriptions, although the volume of 
self-description was variable in both age groups, older children tended to provide a higher 
volume of self-descriptive information. 
 
Table 2: Self-reported autobiographical memory and self-description volume, split by median age 
Self-report  Volume  
 Younger Older 
Specific autobiographical detail M =2.76, SD =2.96, Range = 0-12 M =4.51, SD =3.50, Range = 0-14 
Total self-knowledge  M =1.14, SD =1.49, Range = 0-7 M =2.72, SD =2.44, Range = 0-12 
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  The volume of specific autobiographical detail was analyzed using a univariate 
ANOVA with age as a between subjects factor (Age group: younger, older). This analysis 
confirmed a main effect of age, with older children producing more specific details than 
younger children, F(1, 168) = 12.48, p <.001, partial Ƞ² =.07. 
Self-description scores were also analyzed a univariate ANOVA with age as a 
between subjects factor (Age group: younger, older). A main effect of age was found, with 
older children producing more self-descriptive details than younger children,  F(1, 184) = 
28.54, p < .001, partial Ƞ² = .13.  
In sum, these initial analyses confirm that the expected memory advantage for self-
referenced items emerged in our sample, as did the predicted age effect in source-monitoring, 
volume of autobiographical details recalled and self-descriptions produced by older children. 
(b) Relationship between SRE source scores, self-knowledge and autobiographical memory 
The theoretical predictions of the current inquiry were tested by analyzing all of the 
key measures as continuous variables (age, SRE self- and other-score, SPT self- and other-
score, autobiographical score, self-description scores). Given that there were no SRE task 
interactions, we collapsed across incidental and evaluative SRE scores so that all children 
could be included in a single analysis.  
To assess the relation between tasks, correlations were calculated between specific 
autobiographical memory score, SPT self- and other-scores, SRE self- and other-scores, total 
self-descriptions, age in months and vocabulary score (receptive vocabulary M = 102.08, SD 
= 11.98, Range =67.25-127.96). As shown in Table 3, these analyses indicated that specific 
autobiographical memories correlated moderately with self-descriptions (p <.001), self-
source scores (SPT self p <.001, SRE self p <.001) and age (p <.001), and weakly with other-
source scores (SPT other p =.012, SRE other p =.009). Total self-description scores 
correlated weakly with self- (SPT p <.001, SRE p =.001) and other-source (SPT p =.002, 
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SRE p =.001) scores and moderately with age (p <.001). Source scores also consistently 
correlated within and across tasks, and with age (p <.001 for all). Vocabulary scores were 
unrelated to the majority of measures, correlating only with age in months (p =.005) and self-
source scores in the SRE task (p =.001). This pattern confirms a general age related 
improvement in source-monitoring, which is associated with age-related growth in both 
autobiographical memory and self-description. Since 27 correlations were run, the Benjamini 
Hochberg false-discovery rate procedure was run to assess Type 1 error; the only previously 
significant relationship to lose significance was between autobiographical memory and SPT 
other-source. 
 
Table 3. Summary of correlations for SRE source scores, self-knowledge and autobiographical 
memory tasks, including relations to age and receptive vocabulary. 
 
Self-
Description 
SPT  
self-source 
SPT  
other-source 
SRE  
self-source 
SRE  
other-source Age  
 
 
Vocab 
Autobiographical memory  
  .421**  .313**  .193* † .322**  .199**  .343**  
 
.090 
Self-description 
  _          
.281** .229** .244** .248** .362**  
 
.042 
SPT  
self-source  
 _ 
               
.417** .317**  .354** 
 
.482**   
 
.133 
SPT  
other-source   
_ 
                
.363**   .364**  .453**   
 
.143 
SRE 
self-source    
_ 
     .678**   .610**   
 
 .257** 
SRE  
other-source     
_ 
.562**  
 
.121  
Age  
     
_ 
 
210** 
** p <.001, * p <.05 † non-significant when corrected for false detection rate. 
 
Given these broad relations across tasks, a linear multiple regression was performed 
to assess the best predictors of autobiographical memory from this group. This analysis tested 
our theoretical predictions that the ability to tag (as measured by self-source monitoring) and 
store memories as part of the self-concept (as measured by self-description) may account for 
age-related change in autobiographical memory. Age in months and vocabulary were entered 
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in the first step of the analysis, followed by measures of other-referenced memory abilities 
(i.e., other-performed items in the SPT paradigm, other-referenced items in the SRE 
paradigm) in step 2. Having controlled for the contribution of age, vocabulary and general 
memory capacity in this way, we then entered our self specific measures (i.e., self-performed 
items in the SPT paradigm, self-referenced items in the SRE paradigm, and self-descriptions) 
in step 3. 
At step 1, the model was significant (R² = .118, F (2,169) = 11.169, p < .001), 
accounting for 11.8% of the variance in autobiographical scores. Age (β = .086, p <.001) but 
not vocabulary (β = .006, p =.754) was an independently significant predictor. This confirms 
age-related change in autobiographical memory. At step 2, the model remained significant 
(R² = .120, F (4,169) = 5.601, p < .001), accounting for a similar proportion of variance at 
12%. Age (β = .081, p =.001) continued to have predictive value superior to that of both 
vocabulary (β = .006, p =.787) and other-referencing (SPT other source: β = 1.421, p =.596; 
SRE other source: β = .016, p =.989). At step 3, where the self specific variables were 
entered, the predictive value of the model more than doubled to 26.5% (R² = .265, F (7,169) 
= 8.347, p < .001). Moreover, age dropped out as an independent predictor (β = .025, p 
=.323). Instead, each of the self specific variables made independent predictions: SPT self-
source: β = 4.913 p =.042; SRE self-source: β = 2.452, p =.018; self-description β = .503, p 
<.001). Vocabulary (β =-.002, p =.930) and other specific variables remained insignificant 
(SPT other source: β =-1.304 , p =.610; SRE other source: β =-1.731 , p =.147). Regression 
lines for step 3 are displayed in Figure 1. These results imply the self-knowledge and self-
source monitoring account for a significant proportion of the age-related change in 
autobiographical memory between 3 and 6 years. These analyses also confirm that the 
strongest relationship between autobiographical memory and source monitoring is self-
specific, and not domain general.  
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Figure 1: Regression lines between autobiographical memory and SRE self source (panel a), SPT 
self source (panel b) and self-description (panel c). 
 
To explore the potentially bidirectional relationship between autobiographical 
memory and self-knowledge predicted by Conway’s SMS model, we then ran a regression 
analysis to predict self-description scores. As before, age and vocabulary were entered in step 
1, other specific variables in step 2, and self specific variables (including SPT self source, 
SRE self-source and autobiographical memory) in step 3. At step 1, the model was significant 
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(R² = .121, F (2,169) = 11.521, p < .001), accounting for 12.1% of the variance in self-
knowledge. Age (β = .058, p <.001) but not vocabulary (β = -.005, p =.688) was an 
independently significant predictor. This confirms age-related change in self-knowledge. At 
step 2, the model remained significant (R² = .132, F (4,169) = 6.259, p < .001), accounting 
for a similar proportion of variance at 13.2%. Age (β = .047, p =.003) continued to have 
predictive value superior to that of both vocabulary (β = -.005, p =.688) and other-referencing 
(SPT other source: β = 2.157, p =.214; SRE other source: β = .312, p =.663). At step 3, where 
the self specific variables were entered, the predictive value of the model rose to 23.6% (R² = 
.236, F (7,169) = 7.157, p < .001). Again, age dropped out as an independent predictor (β = 
.030, p =.068). In this instance, autobiographical memory emerged as the only significant 
predictor (β = .222, p <.001). Self-source scores (SPT self-source: β = .802, p =.619; SRE 
self-source: β = -.441, p =.539), vocabulary (β =-.005, p =.674) and other specific variables 
(SPT other source: β =1.713 , p =.312; SRE other source: β =.535, p =.501) did not make a 
significant contribution. These analyses suggest that autobiographical memory is a powerful 
predictor of age-related change in self-knowledge. 
Together, the above analyses suggest that self-source memory and self-knowledge 
predict autobiographical memories, and that autobiographical memories predict self-
knowledge. This implies that the positive relations between self-knowledge and self-source 
monitoring reported in Table 3 may be mediated by a common link with autobiographical 
memory. To test this theory, we ran Haye’s PROCESS mediation analyses, using self-
knowledge as the outcome variable, self-source score as the independent variable, and 
autobiographical memory as the mediator, fitting the data to model 4. For both SPT (b = 2.26, 
BCa CI [1.15, 3.80], Z = 2.24, p = .001) and SRE tasks (b = .840, BCa CI [.453, 1.39], Z = 
3.33 , p =.001) there was a significant indirect effect of self-source monitoring on self-
knowledge through autobiographical memory. The theoretical outcome of these key 
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regression and mediation analyses is displayed in Figure 2; depicting a cyclical relation 
between autobiographical memory and self-knowledge, which the capacity to self-source 
monitor feeds into.   
 
Figure 2: The predictive relations between self source monitoring, autobiographical memory and self-
knowledge 
 
Discussion 
The current inquiry examined the relationship between autobiographical memory, 
source memory for self- and other-referenced stimuli, and self-knowledge in children. 
Consistent with previous research, source monitoring ability increased with age across early 
childhood (Drumney & Newcombe, 2002; Foley & Johnson, 1985; Welch-Ross, 1995b), as 
did autobiographical memory (Hayne et al., 2011; Nuttall et al., 2014; Tustin & Hayne, 
2010), and self-descriptive details (Eder, 1989, 1990; Harter, 1999; Montmayer & Eisen, 
1977). We also found the expected age-invariant memory advantage for both actions and 
objects encoded in a self-referent context (see Cunningham et al., 2014). Extending extant 
research, we identified for the first time predictive relationships between self and memory. 
We hypothesized that source memory for self-referenced actions and objects would predict 
the volume of children’s autobiographical memory as a result of increased self-specific 
binding at encoding, and our analyses confirmed this relationship. We also hypothesized that 
self-description details would predict autobiographical memory because growing self-
knowledge provides a framework in long-term memory. Again, this relationship was 
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supported. Finally, we found evidence to support the hypothesis that the relation between 
autobiographical memory and self-knowledge is bidirectional, as described in Conway’s 
SMS model (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
This pattern of results provides support for Howe and Courage’s (1993, 1997, 2004; 
Howe et al., 2003) theory, which postulates that the self-concept might be viewed as a 
cognitive anchor around which episodic memories can be organized and elaborated, entering 
the autobiographical system. Our results suggest that as the self-concept develops across 3- to 
6 years, the special mnemonic properties associated with self-reference may facilitate the 
capacity to encode memories as part of a personal narrative. As the self-concept expands, as 
indexed here by the volume of self-descriptions, so too does the likelihood that more specific 
autobiographical details will be recalled.  This is an important step in providing empirical 
evidence to support the hypothesis that growth in autobiographical memory is functionally 
related to the development of the self. Guided by Conway’s SMS theory, the role of self in 
memory is well-evidenced in adults (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Rathbone et al., 2008), and the mutual emergence of these systems in two-year-old children 
has some support (Howe et al., 2003). However, the co-development of self and 
autobiographical memory systems across early childhood has remained purely speculative, so 
our results are of considerable theoretical significance.  
By contributing the advancement in knowledge outlined above, the current study 
provides proof of concept for the idea that the SRE paradigm might be usefully adapted to 
elucidate autobiographical memory development (as proposed by Ross et al., 2011a). Adding 
to extant developmental demonstrations of the cognitive SRE in childhood (Bennet & Sani, 
2008; Halpin et al., 1984; Pullyblank et al., 1985; Ross et al., 2011a; Sui & Zhu, 2005) our 
findings support the concrete SRE paradigm adapted by Cunningham et al. (2014) and 
confirm an age-invariant early self-referential bias on memory. Although the SRE observed 
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here was likely primarily attention driven (Cunningham et al., 2014), the self-processing it 
engendered was deep enough to predict autobiographical retention. Our adaptation of the SPT 
task (Ross et al., 2011a Study 1) was similarly successful in demonstrating a robust, low level 
memory advantage for events linked with self at encoding, which was associated with 
autobiographical recall. These findings confirm that the capacity for self-processing has a 
significant impact on the memorability of events within early childhood, despite the nascent 
nature of the self-concept. Of course, the level of self-reference present in each of the 
memory tasks described is open to debate; perhaps the SPT functions as a simple depth of 
processing effect, and the SRE on the basis of familiarity. However, it is indubitable that the 
depth of processing and familiarity effects arising from being a physically embodied self are 
unique, thus whether conscious or not, the effects are self-specific. Moreover, in each of the 
tasks the children were asked to explicitly tag the event as ‘self-referent’, making it difficult 
to argue that conscious self-reference did not play a role (see Ross et al, 2011). 
The current results clearly speak to Howe and Courage’s (1993, 1997, 2004; Howe et 
al., 2003) theory of childhood amnesia, and are highly consistent with SMS theory (Conway, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rathbone et al., 2008). As displayed in Figure 2, 
self-source memory can be viewed as a proxy for the working self in action, leading to 
autobiographical memory, which itself draws from and feeds the self-knowledge system. Our 
results are also broadly consistent with competing theories of the childhood amnesia. The 
relationship that we observe between self-source memory and autobiographical memory, 
together with the bias for self-referent memories, supports the idea that remembering the 
experience of an event adds a depth of processing which supports autobiographical recall 
(Welch-Ross, 1995a). Our findings are also consistent with the idea that binding a memory to 
source information, and the ability to retain specific details of the event, are skills supportive 
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of autobiographical recall (Bauer, 2015;; Hayne, 2004; Johnson et al., 1993; Newcombe et 
al., 2000; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Raj & Bell, 2010).  
However, since we do not measure the distinction between remembering and knowing 
directly, and the children do make some source errors (implying knowledge rather than 
recall), we cannot claim to provide uncomplicated evidence of the role of metacognitive 
remembering. Moreover, although there were domain general relationships between source 
monitoring and the level of specific detail recounted for early life events, self- source 
memory emerged across two tasks (SPT and SRE) to be independently predictive of 
autobiographical memory. These results might be viewed as supporting an emphasis on self-
source binding skills (Johnson et al., 1993; Newcombe et al., 2000; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; 
Raj & Bell, 2010) over general binding ability (Bauer, 2015; Hayne, 2004). Finally, we 
cannot fully assess the role of language in the offset of infantile amnesia using the current 
design. An individual’s expressive vocabulary or verbosity may contribute to the strength of 
the relationship between self-knowledge and autobiographical memory, since both capacities 
were measured through verbal self-report. Thus, although we do not find evidence that 
receptive vocabulary is related to memory development, the contribution of expressive 
vocabulary may nonetheless be important (see Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Welsch-Ross, 1995a). 
One way to test the contribution might be to elicit a non self-referent semantic control 
narrative. However, finding a topic which is neither self-referent nor informed by 
autobiographical memory may be challenging.   
The finding that the self may play a ‘special’ role in memory is in accord with a 
growing body of neuroscience literature which implies that self-referencing in memory across 
a number of diverse paradigms is associated with increased activation in the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) relative to when non-self items are processed (e.g. Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, 
Caglar, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002;; Pfeifer, Lieberman, & Dapretto, 2007; Pfeifer & Peake, 
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2012; Ray et al., 2009). The tendency for the self to automatically trigger attentional 
responses has also been captured neuropsychologically (e.g., Brédart et al., 2006; Gray, 
Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006). Further, it is clear that source 
monitoring and binding abilities may be dependent on maturation of specific brain regions 
(see Raj & Bell, 2010 for review). However, as the vast majority of brain imaging work is 
done with older adults and children, there is a need for further investigation of the neural 
developmental of the SMS in early childhood.  
Importantly, if the self does have a special role in memory in childhood, as supported 
by the current study, then it has significant real-world implications. Firstly, there are 
educational implications whereby self-referential methods could be embedded in educational 
practices to aid memory for material without recourse to expensive resources or additional 
time pressures on staff.  For example, Cunningham and colleagues have demonstrated how 
SREs can be usefully applied to support the processing and retention of maths and literacy 
curricula (Cunningham, Scott, Hutchison, Ross & Martin, 2018; Turk, Gillespie-Smith, 
Krigolson, Havard, Conway & Cunningham, 2015).  
A second key application of this work is in clinical intervention. Self-processing 
systems have been implicated in a number of conditions (see Klein, 2012). Of particular 
relevance to early development, self-processing issues may be an important element of 
autism. Studies of children (Gillespie-Smith, Ballantyne, Branigan, Turk, Cunningham, 2018; 
Henderson et al., 2009) and adults (Grisdale, Lind, Eacott & Williams, 2014; Lombardo, 
Barnes, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Toichi et al., 2002) with autism suggest there 
may be unusual SRE patterns, which may be symptomatic of disruptions in the SMS (see 
Lind & Bowler, 2009). Interestingly, brain imaging studies suggest that adolescents with and 
without ASD show divergent patterns of neural activation when engaged in self-processing 
(Pfeifer, Merchant, Colich, Hernandez, Rudie & Dapretto, 2013). Crucially, understanding 
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any divergent pattern in self-referential processing is only possible once we have a greater 
understanding of typical development of self-referential processing. A clear picture of self-
processing development is therefore vital in order to develop successful strategies and 
interventions for children with developmental disorders associated with disruptions in the 
self-concept and/or autobiographical memory. 
Finally, it is important to establish whether the integrated development the self-
construct and autobiographical memory established here is replicable cross-culturally. Adult 
studies suggest that the self plays a reduced role in memory in non-individualistic cultures 
(Sparks, Cunningham, & Kritikos, 2016; Turk, Walford & Itagaki, 2016; Zhu & Zhang, 
2002). However, there is a lack of developmental work exploring when this cultural 
difference emerges. Wang (2004) finds that 4- to 8-year-olds’ self-descriptions qualitatively 
differ cross-culturally, with Chinese children emphasizing their relations to other people, in 
contrast to American children’s focus on personal attributes and psychological traits. 
American children also tended to provide more detailed and specific autobiographical 
memory reports referencing themselves and their personal preferences. Drawing these 
findings together, Wang (2003) suggests that an autonomous perspective on self may be more 
supportive of autonoetic recall than more collectivistic perspectives. This idea is in keeping 
with Nelson and Fivush’s (2004) socio-cultural theory, suggesting that children’s social 
context might scaffold the development of autobiographical memory. However, infantile and 
childhood amnesia and early adulthood reminiscence bumps are universal; implying that 
although the quality of self and memory may vary cross-culturally, the SMS may be invariant 
(Conway et al., 2005).  
Conclusion 
Contributing to broader gap in the literature concerning the functional development of 
self beyond mirror self-recognition (Ross, 2017; Ross et al., 2011a; Ross, Anderson and 
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Campbell, 2011b; Ross, Yilmaz, Dale, Cassidy, Yildirim & Zeedyk, 2017), the current study 
presents novel empirical evidence of a relationship between autobiographical memory and 
the self-concept. Pioneering the empirical application of a robust source-based SRE in 3- to 
6-year-old children (Cunningham et al., 2014; Ross et al., 2011a), we demonstrate for the 
first time that the volume and specificity of children’s’ autobiographical memories is 
predicted by both the volume of their self-knowledge, and their capacity for self-source 
monitoring within both physical and cognitive SRE paradigms. Drawing from the long 
theorized relationship between self and memory (Hulme, 1739/2003; James, 1890; Locke, 
1690/1995), these results elucidate the emergence of Conway’s (2000, 2005) SMS and 
provide support for the theory that childhood amnesia may be offset by the ability to 
explicitly process event memories in relation to the self (Howe & Courage 1993, 1997, 2004; 
Howe et al., 2003).  
Since the SREs we measure function at various levels (physical, incidental, 
evaluative), which may draw on different aspects of self-consciousness, future studies should 
address how the role of self in memory develops (see Hutchison, Ross & Cunningham, in 
prep; Welch-Ross, 1995a). It is also important to assess how this aspect of autobiographical 
development interacts with other important drivers of infantile and childhood amnesia 
including linguistic and socio-cultural contexts (Fivush, 2011; Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Wang, 
2004), domain general binding abilities (Bauer, 2015; Hayne, 2004; Johnson et al, 1993; 
Newcombe et al., 2000; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Raj & Bell, 2010), and cortical maturation 
(Brédart et al.,2006; Gray et al., 2004; Kelley et al., 2002; Pfeifer et al., 2007; Pfeifer & 
Peake, 2012; Raj & Bell, 2010; Ray et al., 2009; Sui et al., 2006).  
 
 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            32 
 
 
Acknowledgments: This research was supported by a Leverhulme Trust Research Project 
Grant (2014-310) held jointly by the first and last authors, and employing the second author 
as a postdoctoral researcher. We would like to extend our gratitude to the trust and to the 
children and families who participated in this research. 
 
References 
Akshoomoff, N., Newman, E., Thompson, W. K., McCabe, C., Bloss, C. S., Chang, L., ... & 
Gruen, J. R. (2014). The NIH Toolbox Cognition Battery: Results from a large 
normative developmental sample (PING). Neuropsychology, 28(1), 1. doi: 
10.1037/neu0000001 
Bauer, P. J. (2015). A complementary processes account of the development of childhood 
amnesia and a personal past. Psychological Review, 122(2), 204. doi: 
10.1037/a0038939 
Bargh, J. A. (1982). Attention and automaticity in the processing of self-relevant information. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 425–436. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.43.3.425 
Bennett, M., & Sani, F. (2008). Children’s subjective identification with social groups: A 
group reference effect approach. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 26, 
381–387. doi: 10.1348/026151007X246268 
Brédart, S., Delchambre, M., & Laureys, S. (2006). One’s own face is hard to ignore. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59(1), 46-52. 
doi:10.1080/17470210500343678 
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. Journal of Memory and Language, 53(4), 594-
628. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2005.08.005 
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261. 
doi:10.1037//0033-295X.107.2.261 
Conway, M. A., Wang, Q., Hanyu, K., & Haque, S. (2005). A cross-cultural investigation of 
autobiographical memory: On the universality and cultural variation of the 
reminiscence bump. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36(6), 739-749. doi: 
10.1177/0022022105280512 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            33 
 
 
Courage, M. L., Edison, S. C., & Howe, M. L. (2004). Variability in the early development of 
visual self-recognition. Infant Behavior and Development, 27(4), 509-532. doi: 
10.1016/j.infbeh.2004.06.001 
Cunningham, S. J., Brebner, J. L., Quinn, F., & Turk, D. J. (2014). The self-reference effect 
on memory in early childhood. Child Development, 85(2), 808-823. doi: 
10.1111/cdev.12144. 
Cunningham, S. J., Scott, L., Hutchison, J., Ross, J., & Martin, D. (2018). Applying self-
processing biases in education: Improving learning through ownership. Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.04.004 
Cunningham, S. J., & Turk, D. J. (2017). A review of self-processing biases in cognition. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 70(6), 987-995. doi: 
10.1080/17470218.2016.1276609 
Cunningham, S. J., Vergunst, F., Macrae, C. N., & Turk, D. J. (2013). Exploring early self‐
referential memory effects through ownership. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 31(3), 289-301. doi: 10.1111/bjdp.12005 
Drummey, A. B., & Newcombe, N. S. (2002). Developmental changes in source 
memory. Developmental Science, 5(4), 502-513. doi: 10.1111/1467-7687.00243 
Eder, R. A. (1989). The emergent personologist: The structure and content of 3½-, 5½-, and 
7½-year-olds' concepts of themselves and other persons. Child Development, 1218-
1228. doi: 10.2307/1130795 
Eder, R. A. (1990). Uncovering young children's psychological selves: Individual and 
developmental differences. Child Development, 61(3), 849-863. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1990.tb02827.x 
Fivush, R. (2011). The development of autobiographical memory. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 62, 559-582. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131702 
Fivush, R., Haden, C., & Adam, S. (1995). Structure and coherence of preschoolers' personal 
narratives over time: Implications for childhood amnesia. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 60(1), 32-56. doi: 10.1006/jecp.1995.1030 
Fivush, R., & Reese, E. (1992). The social construction of autobiographical memory. 
In Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory (pp. 115-132). Dordrecht: 
Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-94-015-7967-4_7 
Foley, M. A., & Johnson, M. K. (1985). Confusions between memories for performed and 
imagined actions: A developmental comparison. Child Development, 1145-1155. doi: 
10.2307/1130229 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            34 
 
 
Gillespie‐Smith, K., Ballantyne, C., Branigan, H. P., Turk, D. J., & Cunningham, S. J. (2018). 
The I in autism: Severity and social functioning in autism are related to self‐
processing. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 36(1), 127-141. doi:  
Gray, H. M., Ambady, N., Lowenthal, W. T., & Deldin, P. (2004). P300 as an index of 
attention to self-relevant stimuli. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(2), 
216-224. doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00092-1 
Grisdale, E., Lind, S. E., Eacott, M. J., & Williams, D. M. (2014). Self-referential memory in 
autism spectrum disorder and typical development: Exploring the ownership 
effect. Consciousness and Cognition, 30, 133-141. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.023 
Halpin, J. A., Puff, C. R., Mason, H. F., & Marston, S. P. (1984). Self-reference encoding and 
incidental recall by children. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 22(2), 87-89. doi: 
10.3758/BF03333770 
Harley, K., & Reese, E. (1999). Origins of autobiographical memory. Developmental 
Psychology, 35(5), 1338.  
Harter, S. (1999). The construction of the self: A developmental perspective. Guilford Press. 
Hayne, H. (2004). Infant memory development: Implications for childhood 
amnesia. Developmental Review, 24(1), 33-73. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2003.09.007 
Hayne, H., Gross, J., McNamee, S., Fitzgibbon, O., & Tustin, K. (2011). Episodic memory 
and episodic foresight in 3-and 5-year-old children. Cognitive Development, 26(4), 
343-355. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.09.006 
Henderson, H. A., Zahka, N. E., Kojkowski, N. M., Inge, A. P., Schwartz, C. B., Hileman, C. 
M., Coman, D. C., & Mundy, P. C. (2009). Self‐referenced memory, social cognition, 
and symptom presentation in autism. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 50(7), 853-861. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2008.02059.x 
Henri, V., & Henri, C. (1898) Earliest recollections. Popular Science Monthly, 53, pp. 108-
115. 
Howe, M. L., & Courage, M. L. (1993). On resolving the enigma of infantile 
amnesia. Psychological Bulletin, 113(2), 305-326. doi: 10.1032.113.2.305  
Howe, M. L., & Courage, M. L. (1997). The emergence and early development of 
autobiographical memory. Psychological Review, 104(3), 499-523. doi: 
10.1037/0033-295X.104.3.499 
Howe, M. L., & Courage, M. L. (2004). Demystifying the beginnings of 
memory. Developmental Review, 24(1), 1-5. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2003.09.006 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            35 
 
 
Howe, M. L., Courage, M. L., & Edison, S. C. (2003). When autobiographical memory 
begins. Developmental Review, 23(4), 471-494. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2003.09.001 
Hume, D. (2003). A treatise of human nature. New York: Dover Publications. (Original work 
published 1739) 
Hutchison, J., Ross, J. & Cunningham, S. (in prep). Growing me: The development of the 
self-reference effect across the lifespan. 
 
James, W. (1890). The consciousness of self. In Principles of psychology (pp. 291–401). New 
York: Holt. 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychological 
Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3 
Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Wyland, C. L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T. F. 
(2002). Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 14(5), 785-794. doi:10.1162/08989290260138672 
Klein, S. B. (2012). Self, memory, and the self-reference effect: An examination of 
conceptual and methodological issues. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 16(3), 283-300. doi:10.1177/1088868311434214 
Lind, S. E., & Bowler, D. M. (2009). Recognition memory, self-other source memory, and 
theory-of-mind in children with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 39(9), 1231. doi: 10.1007/s10803-009-0735-2 
Locke, J. (1995). An essay concerning human understanding. Retrieved from 
http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/locke_understanding.html (Original work 
published 1690) 
Lombardo, M. V., Barnes, J. L., Wheelwright, S. J., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2007). Self-
referential cognition and empathy in autism. PloS one, 2(9), e883. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0000883 
Montmayor, R., & Eisen, M. (1977). The development of self-conceptions from childhood to 
adolescence. Developmental Psychology, 13(4), 314. doi: 10.1037/0012-
1649.13.4.314 
Nelson, K., & Fivush, R. (2004). The emergence of autobiographical memory: a social 
cultural developmental theory. Psychological Review, 111(2), 486. doi: 
10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.486 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            36 
 
 
Newcombe, N. S., Drummey, A. B., Fox, N. A., Lie, E., & Ottinger-Alberts, W. (2000). 
Remembering early childhood: How much, how, and why (or why not). Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 9(2), 55-58. doi: 10.1111/1467-8721.00060 
Nuttall, A. K., Valentino, K., Comas, M., McNeill, A. T., & Stey, P. C. (2014). 
Autobiographical memory specificity among preschool-aged children. Developmental 
Psychology, 50(7), 1963. doi: 10.1037/a0036988 
Perner, J., & Ruffman, T. (1995). Episodic memory and autonoetic conciousness: 
developmental evidence and a theory of childhood amnesia. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 59(3), 516-548. doi: 10.1006/jecp.1995.1024 
Pfeifer, J. H., Lieberman, M. D., & Dapretto, M. (2007). “I know you are but what am I?!”: 
neural bases of self-and social knowledge retrieval in children and adults. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(8), 1323-1337. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2007.19.8.1323 
Pfeifer, J. H., Merchant, J. S., Colich, N. L., Hernandez, L. M., Rudie, J. D., & Dapretto, M. 
(2013). Neural and behavioral responses during self-evaluative processes differ in 
youth with and without autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 43(2), 272-285. doi: 10.1007/s10803-012-1563-3 
Pfeifer, J. H., & Peake, S. J. (2012). Self-development: integrating cognitive, socioemotional, 
and neuroimaging perspectives. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 2(1), 55-69. 
doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2011.07.012 
Pillemer, D. B., & White, S. H. (1989). Childhood events recalled by children and adults. 
In Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 21, pp. 297-340). New York: 
Academic Press. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2407(08)60291-8 
Pillow, B. H. (1989). Early understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 47(1), 116-129. doi: 10.1016/0022-0965(89)90066-0 
Piolino, P., Hisland, M., Ruffeveille, I., Matuszewski, V., Jambaqué, I., & Eustache, F. 
(2007). Do school-age children remember or know the personal past?. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 16(1), 84-101. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.010 
Prudhomme, N. (2005). Early declarative memory and self-concept. Infant Behavior and 
Development, 28(2), 132-144. doi: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2005.01.002 
Pullyblank, J., Bisanz, J., Scott, C., & Champion, M. A. (1985). Developmental invariance in 
the effects of functional self-knowledge on memory. Child Development, 1447-1454. 
doi: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2005.01.002 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            37 
 
 
Raj, V., & Bell, M. A. (2010). Cognitive processes supporting episodic memory formation in 
childhood: The role of source memory, binding, and executive functioning. 
Developmental Review, 30(4), 384-402. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2011.02.001 
Rathbone, C. J., Moulin, C. J., & Conway, M. A. (2008). Self-centered memories: The 
reminiscence bump and the self. Memory & Cognition, 36(8), 1403-1414. doi: 
10.3758/MC.36.8.140 
Ray, R. D., Shelton, A. L., Hollon, N. G., Michel, B. D., Frankel, C. B., Gross, J. J., & 
Gabrieli, J. D. (2009). Cognitive and neural development of individuated self‐
representation in children. Child Development, 80(4), 1232-1242. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01327.x 
Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N. A., & Kirker, W. S. (1977). Self-reference and the encoding of 
personal information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(9), 677. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.677 
Ross, J. (2017). You and me: Investigating the role of self-evaluative emotion in preschool 
prosociality. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 155, 67-83. doi: 
10.1016/j.jecp.2016.11.001 
Ross, J., Anderson, J. R., & Campbell, R. N. (2011b). Situational changes in self-awareness 
influence 3-and 4-year-olds’ self-regulation. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 108(1), 126-138. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2010.08.003 
Ross, J., Anderson, J.R., & Campbell, R.N. (2011a). I remember me: Investigating mnemonic 
self-reference effects in preschool children. Monographs of the Society for Research 
in Child Development, 76, 1-102. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5834.2011.00613.x 
Ross, J., Yilmaz, M., Dale, R., Cassidy, R., Yildirim, I., & Suzanne Zeedyk, M. (2017). 
Cultural differences in self‐recognition: the early development of autonomous and 
related selves?. Developmental Science, 20(3), e12387. doi: 10.1111/desc.12387 
Rubin, D. C., Wetzler, S. E., & Nebes, R. D.  (1986). Autobiographical memory across the 
life span. In Autobiographical Memory (pp. 202-221). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. doi: 10.1111/desc.12387 
Sparks, S., Cunningham, S. J., & Kritikos, A. (2016). Culture modulates implicit ownership-
induced self-bias in memory. Cognition, 153, 89-98. doi: 
10.1016/j.cognition.2016.05.003 
Sui, J., & Zhu, Y. (2005). Five-year-olds can show the self-reference 
advantage. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 29(5), 382-387. doi: 
10.1080/01650250500172673 
The ‘me’ in memory                                                                                                                                            38 
 
 
Sui, J., Zhu, Y., & Han, S. (2006). Self-face recognition in attended and unattended 
conditions: an event-related brain potential study. Neuroreport, 17(4), 423-427. doi: 
10.1097/01.wnr.0000203357.65190.61 
Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in memory: a meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 371. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.371 
Toichi, M., Kamio, Y., Okada, T., Sakihama, M., Youngstrom, E. A., Findling, R. L., & 
Yamamoto, K. (2002). A lack of self-consciousness in autism. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 159(8), 1422-1424. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.159.8.1422 
Tulving, E. (2005). Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human. In The missing link in 
cognition: Origins of self-reflective consciousness (pp 3-56). New York: Oxford 
University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.003.0001 
Turk, D. J., Cunningham, S. J., & Macrae, C. N. (2008). Self-memory biases in explicit and 
incidental encoding of trait adjectives. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(3), 1040-
1045. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.004 
Turk, D. J., Gillespie-Smith, K., Krigolson, O. E., Havard, C., Conway, M. A., & 
Cunningham, S. J. (2015). Selfish learning: The impact of self-referential encoding on 
children's literacy attainment. Learning and Instruction, 40, 54-60. doi: 
10.1016/j.learninstruc.2015.08.001 
Tustin, K., & Hayne, H. (2010). Defining the boundary: Age-related changes in childhood 
amnesia. Developmental Psychology, 46(5), 1049. doi: 10.1037/a0020105 
Wang, Q. (2003). Infantile amnesia reconsidered: A cross-cultural analysis. Memory, 11(1), 
65-80. doi: 10.1080/741938173 
Wang, Q. (2004). The emergence of cultural self-constructs: autobiographical memory and 
self-description in European American and Chinese children. Developmental 
Psychology, 40(1), 3. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.40.1.3 
Welch-Ross, M. K. (1995a). An integrative model of the development of autobiographical 
memory. Developmental Review. doi: 10.1006/drev.1995.1013 
Welch-Ross, M. K. (1995b). Developmental changes in preschoolers' ability to distinguish 
memories of performed, pretended, and imagined actions. Cognitive 
Development, 10(3), 421-441. doi: 10.1016/0885-2014(95)90005-5 
 Zhu, Y., & Zhang, L. (2002). An experimental study on the self-reference effect. Science in 
China Series C: Life Sciences, 45(2), 120-128. doi: 10.1360/02yc9014 
